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This paper reviews a range of studies that examine differences in growth perfor-
mance among transition countries. There is a consensus in the literature about the
core elements of transition and the policies necessary for sustainable growth,
although considerable differences remain about how to implement these policies
and about their proper sequencing. The empirical work identifies stabilization and
structural reforms (e.g., market liberalization, private ownership) as important
determinants of growth, but underlines the role of initial conditions and institu-
tions. There is divergent evidence, however, on the importance of specific reforms.
Traditional factor inputs have as yet no role in explaining growth. [JEL O40, P20]
T
he first comprehensive program of reforms in a centrally planned socialist
economy is widely recognized to be Poland’s late 1989 package under the new
Solidarity government. This dating permits analysts to think of a decade anniver-
sary already in 1999 and certainly in 2000, hence the ensuing spate of 10-year
conferences and retrospectives. More important than the decadal marking point is
the reality that enough time has passed to allow substantial quantitative and qual-
itative observations, to see the variation in progress of transition toward the
market, to note country differences in economic performance indicators such as
GDP growth, exports, foreign investment, and to identify broadly the more
successful and less successful cases. This paper addresses the narrow issue of
growth in GDP, by providing a review of a growing literature explaining the differ-
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Campayne for an excellent job of text preparation.ences in growth performance among transition countries. The focus is on non-
Asian transition economies, in keeping with much of the literature’s separate treat-
ment of China and others in Asia.
Transformation from a centrally planned to a market economy is a multi-
faceted process of political, economic, social, and—not least important, as is
increasingly recognized—institutional changes. Within the economic sphere,
growth of aggregate output may be considered only one of many dimensions in the
process. But such a narrow view would understate considerably the role of
recovery and growth in GDP. True, growth is only the final link in a long and
complex chain of transformation that involves, in approximate sequence, policies
to implement market mechanisms; structural changes across and within sectors
and firms (in other words, reallocation of resources); improvements in efficiency
and new investments; and finally, recovery of output and sustained growth.
However, even in the broadest “system paradigm” of transition (Kornai, 1998),
growth of output and the attendant improvement in the well-being of the populace
is, arguably, the key purpose of changing the system. At a minimum, strong
sustained growth is a necessary outcome of a successful transition, and—given the
lack of a yardstick for measuring progress in the ex ante policy and institutional
movements toward the market—growth may serve as a very good ex post proxy
for such progress.1
I. Analytical Framework for Growth in Transition
It continues to be popular to say that there is no theory to guide the practical
process of transition, only theories of capitalism and socialism. This may still be
true in the sense that a new consensus paradigm has not emerged from the vast
literature on transition, though it is not clear how much a unified, cohesive theory
is needed to understand the main developments.2 To the extent it is useful to have
a compact rather than complex analytical framework, it is not that difficult to
cobble together from selected key writings a workable “model” of transition or
transformation. Kornai (1994), in describing the special circumstances of the
“transformational” recession compared with a market economy recession, high-
lights two key changes that are needed: forcing a move from a sellers’to a buyers’
market  (via price liberalization), and enforcing a hard budget constraint (via
privatization and elimination of various government support mechanisms such as
budget subsidies, directed low-cost credits, and tax exemptions). This provides the
two principal incentives for profit-maximizing market behavior of all economic
agents. Blanchard (1997) defines the core process of actual change as comprising
two elements: reallocation of resources from old to new activities (via closures and
bankruptcies combined with establishment of new enterprises); and restructuring
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1The central role of growth rates as reflections of successful transition is implicit in several studies
projecting long-term future growth potential, motivated by the question of how long it might take to catch
up to EU country levels (e.g., Fischer, Sahay, and Végh,1998a; Sachs and Warner, 1996).
2Kornai (1998) explores the possibility of what he prefers to call a “system paradigm”; one key argu-
ment he makes is that transition by definition does not need a paradigm or theory—only the beginning
and end-point systems do.within surviving firms (via labor rationalization, product line change, and new
investment). These two changes, which are very reminiscent of the Schumpeterian
concept of “creative destruction,” should be stimulated by the new incentives.3 In
the end, the transformation moves the economy to a resource allocation state
consistent with its comparative advantage. The key policy actions needed to put in
place Kornai’s new incentives are described in many works (including those by
Kornai (1994) and Blanchard (1997)), and are exemplified by the list of Fischer
and Gelb (1991): macroeconomic stabilization; price and market liberalization;
liberalization of the exchange and trade system; privatization of state-owned firms;
establishing a competitive environment with easy market entry and exit; and
redefining the role of the state as the provider of macro stability, a stable legal
framework, and enforceable property rights, and occasionally as a corrector of
market imperfections.
The above simplification does not do justice to the large theoretical and policy
literature, and the continuing sharp debates about transition. One school of thought
advocates following broadly the Washington consensus elements—essentially
those listed above—and includes the view that more rapid and earlier implemen-
tation is generally better (in various shades of nuancing, with Sachs (1996) at the
extreme end). A second school of thought argues—in theory if not in practice—
that transition can occur too quickly, which will cause more costly disruption than
beneficial restructuring and therefore risk undermining the will to continue.
Aghion and Blanchard (1993); Blanchard and Kremer (1997); and Roland and
Verdier (1999) exemplify the theoretical work along these lines. Stiglitz (1999)—
with whom the former do not necessarily agree—argues ex post that excessive
speed was indeed a problem in practice and explains the dramatic failures of priva-
tization and lack of recovery in many transition countries, including, for example,
Russia. A third school of thought focusing on institutions argues, as Murrell
(1992), that stabilization and liberalization are needed but will not have the
intended results if the institutions of market operations are inadequately devel-
oped.4 But all of these debating schools appear to agree on what the transition
process is, and their views are in general compatible with the Fischer-Gelb
description of the core elements. Their differences are more about how to conduct
policy to best achieve the results of transformation. Nevertheless, these debates are
relevant and find reflection (mostly, ad hoc) in the specifications of econometric
analysis of growth in transition reviewed later in this paper.
From the core concept of transformation defined above there follow some
implications for growth, which differentiate transition economies from market
economies and provide the basis for the empirical analysis of determinants of
recovery in transition. First, output will necessarily decline initially under the new
buyer’s market and hard budget constraints, since unsalable goods accumulate and
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3The EBRD Transition Report (1997) provides an excellent review of the conceptual framework in
the “creative destruction” spirit, as well as empirical analysis of structural changes in the transition so far.
4It is frequently said by critics (e.g., Roland (2001) in this Special Issue of IMF Staff Papers) that the
Washington Consensus erred greatly by omitting institutional development; the Fischer and Gelb (1991)
article is but one of many that show that this was simply not true. Of course, it is still possible to argue
that institutions, while mentioned in passing, were not given enough weight in practice.signal the need for cutbacks in production. Further elimination of the wastage
found under the old regime has to precede creation of the new regime, adding to
the production cuts. Second, growth of the new regime will not occur until the new
incentives are in place and made credible; that is, the sooner reforms achieve a
hard budget and liberal price environment, the sooner reallocation and the restruc-
turing of old and creation of new production can begin. The lag can be attributed
to the “disorganization” effect of Blanchard and Kremer (1997), as central plan-
ning mechanisms are not immediately replaced by market coordination mecha-
nisms. Third, in the early recovery period, a variety of efficiency improvements are
more likely to be useful than an expansion of either investment or labor factor
inputs. With labor fully (but inefficiently) employed, and much capital stock—
again inefficient—accumulated from earlier Soviet investments, the room for
factor-expansion growth is limited. Indeed, as Easterly and Fischer (1995) and De
Broeck and Koen (2000b) suggest, growing inefficiency was one reason the Soviet
system collapsed.
Starting from a Soviet-period (inefficient and distorted) output level as shown
in Figure A1 in the Appendix, five types of mechanisms, many of which may be
simultaneous or overlapping, can help increase output: recovery of underutilized
capacity; elimination of egregious waste of labor, capital, and materials (X-
efficiency, improvements); efficiency gains from a more appropriate combination
of capital and labor (factor efficiency); efficiency gains from resource reallocation
toward goods in which a country has a comparative advantage or for which there
is unsatisfied consumer demand; and output expansion via new net investment and
employment increases.5
It is notable that only the last item above involves factor expansion, while all
the others are some form of efficiency gains. The empirical evidence described
below will confirm that the early period of transition recovery is largely based on
efficiency gains and that investments—physical or human capital—are not the
important determinant generally seen in the growth literature.
II. The Record on Growth
Output declined substantially from 1989, for 25 non-Asian transition coun-
tries.6 Recovery began only hesitantly in 1993 in two or three countries in Central
Europe, then spread gradually and accelerated by the end of the decade (Table 1).
By 1995, virtually all Central European countries plus the Baltic countries were
experiencing this recovery, while further east only 2 of 12 countries were begin-
Oleh Havrylyshyn
56
5It is a simplification to say that all the efficiency improvements (all but the last item in the list) can
come about without new net investments; what is meant here is that the investment required is often small.
Also, such efficiency improvements can take place at the sector or firm level even if aggregate net invest-
ment in the economy is zero, since new gross investment is directed not to replace depreciated stocks in
“old” industries but to expand it in the “new” ones.
6Data in this section use the official GDP measure, excluding what many have demonstrated is a large
underground economy—see Johnson, Kaufmann, and Shleifer (1997)—and uncorrected for other possible
errors—see Bloem, Cotterell, and Gigantes (1996). The reasons for this choice are simple: first, only GDP
data are systematically available for a long period for all countries; and second, different estimates of
unofficial economy values give differing results. There is at least one study, Loungani and Sheets (1997),ning to grow (Armenia and Georgia after their civil conflicts came to an end). It
was only by 1997 that a majority of the CIS7 countries saw positive growth. The
Russian crisis of 1998 caused a brief slowdown in this trend for 1998–99, but by
2000 a strong recovery was evident in the whole region, particularly in the CIS.
Thus, on balance, the first half of the 1990s was largely a period of decline, while
the second half was marked by a gradual spread of recovery from the deep and
long transitional depression, only briefly interrupted by the spillovers from the
1998 Russian crisis.
It is generally agreed that the depth and length of the decline has been greatest
for the CIS countries, somewhat less for the Baltics, and much less in Central and
Southeast Europe. Fischer and Sahay (2000), for example, give respective decline
values through 1998 of about 54 percent, 43 percent, and 28 percent. Growth rates
since recovery began have been quite high in general at 4–6 percent, but, except
for a couple of oil economies (Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan), this falls short of the
levels in East Asia and China during their boom years. Indeed, the best non-oil
performer, Poland, has approached 7 percent growth in only two of eight years of
growth. At the other end of the range, Ukraine had continuous decline through
1999, and several countries had an erratic pattern of growth followed by decline—
Moldova, the Kyrgyz Republic, and Romania. Turkmenistan has only shown posi-
tive rates as a partial rebound after disastrous years of sharp decline. In summary,
growth is spreading but there is a lot of variation across countries; it is too early to
speak of sustained growth except in Central Europe and the Baltics; and even the
better performers still fall short of the growth levels seen earlier in Asia.
Three broad categories of transition economies can be identified:8 about
15–16 countries with consistent growth; 3 countries with sharp reversals, and
about 5–6 countries with almost continuous decline until 1999. The first group
includes the Baltics and Central Europe, in which the growth rates since recovery
began have averaged approximately 4–5 percent—except for the brief but sharp
dip in the Baltic countries after the Russian crisis. These cases form the strongest
basis for the argument that better stabilization and structural reform policies
produce better performance. Consistently positive growth is also observable in
several CIS countries, but with rather different stories for each of them. Armenia
and Georgia had strong rebounds from civil war periods; Azerbaijan had an oil-
based expansion; growth in the Kyrgyz Republic is partly attributable to new gold
production; and Belarus and Uzbekistan may have been special cases of delayed
reforms, delaying the post-Soviet decline—at the very least, they provide fodder
for debate (see Zettelmeyer, 1998, on the Uzbekistan “puzzle”). The second
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which finds that using electricity consumption as a proxy for growth does not materially affect the results
of growth empirics. The bias may be thought to mean that less reformed economies with more under-
ground activity have higher growth than officially measured but, suprisingly, a recent paper by Åslund
(2001) that tries to correct several measurement problems concludes that these corrections strengthen the
positive correlation between growth and reforms. The issue nevertheless remains debatable.
7The CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) comprises the following countries: the Republic of
Armenia, the Azerbaijan Republic, the Republic of Belarus, Georgia, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the
Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Moldova, the Russia Federation, the Republic of Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and the Republic of Uzbekistan.








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































58group—Albania, Bulgaria, and Romania—saw early recoveries with reversals to
negative growth, apparently related to inadequate reform efforts; followed by
policy corrections and a new recovery at least for the first two. Finally, the third
group, which encompasses much of the CIS including Russia and Ukraine, saw
limited or no growth until 1999, well after the impact of the Russian crisis was
overcome. The eventual strong growth of Kazakhstan and Russia was partly driven
by favorable energy export prices, though the delayed cumulative effects of earlier
reforms cannot be excluded as an explanation; the latter factor may have been even
more important in Ukraine.
As of 1999 (2000 growth rates are preliminary), only four countries had reat-
tained or surpassed their officially measured output levels in 1989.9 Each of these
was in Central Europe, with real GDP in 1999 in Poland exceeding that of 1989
by 22 percent, Slovenia and Slovakia exceeded 1989 growth by about 5 percent,
and Hungary just reached its 1989 level. At the other extreme, with measured
output still less than one-half the immediate pretransition level, were five CIS
countries. One of these, Georgia (47 percent of 1991 output), has actually been
growing for four years. The other four are all in the third grouping (little or no
growth): Tajikistan and Turkmenistan (about 45 percent of the 1991 level),
Moldova (40 percent), and Ukraine (41 percent).
While growth by 2000 was almost universal, there were clearly many differ-
ences in the record, and many different explanations. The general tendency that
central European countries and the Baltics had better performance than countries
of the CIS suggests the importance of better policy (stabilization and structural
reforms) and different specific conditions such as wars, oil, or other natural
resources, different starting points, or initial conditions. The very recent surge of
growth in the CIS group is too short-lived to assess, but may reflect a rebound
from very low levels of output reached after decline, perhaps analogous to the
long-term convergence notion in growth empirics. Section III reviews more
systematic econometric evidence, which has tried to elaborate and quantify the
various determinants noted above.
III. Empirics of Growth in Transition
The broader literature on transition has grown rapidly, and many recent arti-
cles address, at least peripherally, the issue of success, performance, and output
growth. This survey focuses more narrowly on studies that undertake a quantita-
tive analysis of growth determinants. Table 2 lists chronologically and summarizes
23 such studies, which form the core of this paper’s analysis. As noted earlier, the
focus is on non-Asian economies, that is, Central Europe, the Baltic countries, and
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9The possible bias in official statistics understating growth, as noted in footnote 6, is in this case in
the opposite direction. The actual level of GDP before recovery is in most cases probably exaggerated,
owing both to the probable underestimation by official statistics of the size of the unofficial economy
during the transition and to the likelihood that initial GDP was in most cases overstated since it did not
reflect the welfare losses from disequilibrium pricing and associated shortages and queues. The recent
paper by Åslund (2001) explores this in some detail, looking at underground activity as well as price
distortions in Soviet period, inadequate negative valuation of useless products, etc.the CIS.10 The coverage varies, but generally covers the period since 1989, and in
one case through 1998; thus, the sample size is as little as 18–20 observations
(cross-section regressions) to as many as 225 (panel of 25 countries, 9 years).
Perhaps the first comprehensive study to ask the question “what determines
differences in growth rates across transition countries” was that of de Melo,
Denizer, and Gelb (1997).11 The econometric specification there—with variables
representing initial conditions, liberalization, or structural reform, financial stabi-
lization—largely set the tone for specifications and indeed the general conclusions
in later studies.
First, consider some aspects of coverage and methodology, summarized tele-
graphically in the last two columns of Table 2. Later studies naturally cover more
years since 1990 and are, therefore, mostly panel regressions, in contrast to the
early cross-country regressions. The difference in degrees of freedom is large;
cross-section studies for this group of countries use average growth for several
years and imply about 25 observations, often less, while analysis done in the late
1990s with 8–9 years of data and pooling can have as many as 200–225 observa-
tions. While one is tempted to heavily discount early and cross-section-only
studies using OLS with nary room for a lag, a pleasant surprise pops up from this
survey. The broad conclusions of the simpler studies—to wit, the standard factor
inputs are not important; stabilization is necessary; liberalization and structural
reforms strongly affect growth performance, and unfavorable initial conditions
can hinder growth—are not dramatically altered in those studies with a large
observation set and much more sophisticated econometrics. The broad robustness
of these conclusions to coverage and methodology (see the subsection below on
methodological difficulties) may be a testament to the overwhelming importance
of these determinant variables, or the potential for simple methodology wisely
used to yield powerful results, or both. Nevertheless, it is only the more sophisti-
cated econometrics permitted by a large sample that can isolate the finer points of
interpretations—for example, how unfavorable initial conditions result in sharper
output declines early on but become less important in determining growth over
time; or the fact that discipline of reforms yields immediate gains in a newly
private sector even if there is continued total decline in GDP; or the increasing
importance of too slow institutional development. We now review both the key
findings of this literature and some of these finer points.
Key Findings
Stabilization
The  first  and largely noncontroversial conclusion is that stabilization is a
necessary condition for recovery of output. Virtually all of the studies included
some measure of stabilization—fiscal deficit, inflation, and, in a handful of cases,
Oleh Havrylyshyn
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10Some of the studies—Fischer, Sahay, and Végh (1996, 1998), and Berg and others (1999)—also
include Mongolia.
11A first version of this was presented at the First Dubrovnik Conference on Transition, June 1995,












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 exchange rate anchor—and the results are almost always significant: that stabi-
lization contributes to growth, or at least that growth does not occur until stabi-
lization is achieved. A majority of the studies use only an inflation variable to
reflect stabilization, positing (and finding) a negative sign in growth regressions.
The few that include both inflation and a fiscal deficit (Wolf, 1997; Loungani and
Sheets, 1997; Berg and others, 1999) show varying results. Berg and others find
that “fiscal balance survived [exclusion tests] in most models,” (p. 50) but the
contemporaneous effect is puzzling as it implies that “tight fiscal policies sustain
production in the state sectors but negatively impact the private sector.” Loungani
and Sheets concluded that “fiscal deficits have tended to be stimulating” (p. 10),
while Wolf reaches the contrary conclusion, as do Fischer, Sahay, and Végh (1996
and 1998b)—though the latter find the fiscal variable loses statistical significance
in presence of other explanatory variables, in particular liberalization. From the
above, one concludes that the empirical literature is nearly unanimous on the nega-
tive impact of inflation on growth but has not been able to disentangle the sepa-
rate effects of fiscal deficits and inflation on growth. This may be explained by
either (or both) of two difficulties. First, the regressions are not in most cases
derived from a structural model of growth in transition and they exclude a simul-
taneous determination of inflation and growth, though some do estimate separate
equations for inflation, in which fiscal deficits generally show up significantly
and, as expected, positively correlated (de Melo, Denizer, and Gelb, 1997; Fischer,
and Gelb, Sahay, and Végh (1998b); Åslund, Boone, and Johnson, 1996). Second,
fiscal deficits may be too narrowly measured, and underestimate the “public sector
deficit,” which includes off-budget transfers, tax easing, central bank credits,
and/or accommodation of directed credits by banks plus—most important for CIS
countries—arrears problems.
Only a handful of studies consider the role of exchange rate anchors explic-
itly. Fischer, Sahay, and Végh (1998b), in particular, test for fixed exchange rate
regimes with a dummy variable and conclude that “a fixed exchange rate and
smaller fiscal deficits seem especially important in reducing inflation and raising
growth rates.” It is important to note that, in their model, the fixed-rate variable is
negative and significant in the inflation regression, and positive and significant in
the growth regressions that do not include inflation as a separate variable but in
which the fiscal variable loses significance in presence of other explanatory vari-
ables. Thus, the impact of the exchange rate anchors on growth could be indirect
only, working through the inflation stabilization effect. Recall that most other
growth regressions have inflation as an argument in the growth equation. Thus the
specification, not being in structural form, may not fully capture the mechanisms
of effects on growth. Another missing variable here may be arrears, as noted; if a
peg is intended to enforce fiscal discipline but this is achieved by running arrears,
the coefficient estimate for a peg without an arrears correction will be at best
weakened. Nevertheless, other studies, while somewhat more skeptical of the clear
conclusion about fixed rates, do not fundamentally contradict it. Cottarelli and
Doyle (1999) explore the possibility of disinflation causing output losses and find
that such difficulties only occur in presence of exchange rate pegs, but even then,
“the losses seem likely to be due to undervalued pegs, rather than pegs per se.”
Oleh Havrylyshyn
68Hernández-Catá (1997) also finds “results provide some—but not much—support
for the view that fixed nominal exchange rates have contributed (to output growth
but perhaps indirectly) by helping to bring down inflation.”
Liberalization and Structural Reforms
The second set of findings concern liberalizing reforms; virtually all the
studies that include a reform variable have affirmed the de Melo, Denizer, and
Gelb result on the strong and positive role of liberalization and structural reforms.
Whether the model was a simple one relating only to growth and some index of
structural reforms (Sachs, 1996; Selowsky and Martin, 1997), or a more complex
one reflecting also the effects of stabilization, initial conditions, and conflicts (as
in Åslund, Boone, and Johnson, 1996; Fischer, Sahay, and Végh, 1996;
Hernández-Catá, 1997; de Melo, Denizer, and Gelb, 1997; Havrylyshyn, Izvorski,
and van Rooden, 1998; and Berg and others, 1999), the conclusion was firm: more
reforms are associated with better growth performance. The results are not without
clear country exceptions, Belarus and Uzbekistan being the key ones today,
Bulgaria and Romania earlier. Belarus remains an understudied case, but three
points suggest the numbers overstate performance or its sustainability. Much of its
growth was based on exports to Russia bartered for energy and other products; its
largely unreformed system meant a high degree of directed credits to the economy
and a much higher inflation than its neighbors; and after the Russia crisis, its
exports and growth fell sharply.12 Zettelmeyer (1998) shows for Uzbekistan that
structural and macroeconomic policies alone cannot explain the better-than-
average performance and finds initial conditions, in particular the low degree of
industrialization and cotton export potential, helped cushion the decline and
perhaps promote an early recovery. Fischer and Sahay (2000) point to the directed
credits and vulnerability of Russia-oriented exports. Bulgaria and Romania,
despite limited structural reforms and stabilization, saw an early growth recovery,
probably fueled by directed credits, but the unsustainability of such growth was
made clear by the collapse in 1996–97. Related to these exceptions, Åslund,
Boone, and Johnson (1996) observe an interesting dichotomy in the literature
concerning the pace of reforms: while theoretical work on transition has often
shown a gradual pace might lead to less early decline of output (e.g., Aghion and
Blanchard, 1993, Dewatripont and Roland, 1995), empirical studies generally
conclude that fast and early reforms result in early and sustained recovery.
The strong findings on stabilization and structural reforms would appear to
vindicate, at least broadly, the major elements of the Washington Consensus
(which as footnote 4 noted does incorporate institutional development notwith-
standing statements of critics). An important policy question is whether some of
the components are more important than others (e.g., privatization) or whether, as
Aziz and Wescott (1997) conclude for all developing countries, it is the package
that counts. The results for transition countries tend to confirm the view that all
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12Furthermore, as IMF (2002) reports, a methodological problem with the industrial production index
results in an overestimate of 1–2 percentage points.policies matter to some extent, as does institutional development, though some
components are found to be separately important. Furthermore, when the reform
variable is a single aggregate index, its coefficient is invariably significant; when
components of liberalization (price, internal, external liberalization, privatization
or private sector share) are considered separately, the results are more mixed. Thus
Fischer, Sahay, and Végh (1998b) find that aggregate liberalization is highly
significant, but separately external liberalization or private sector environment
(including banking) are less so, while internal liberalization (prices, and competi-
tion environment) is not significant, though still positive. Havrylyshyn, Izvorski,
and van Rooden (1998) use these three components plus a legal reforms index of
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), but argue
further that the underlying structural relations differ in the period of decline
(1990–93) and recovery (1994–97).13 They in fact find different effects of liberal-
izing reforms; internal/price liberalization has at first a negative effect—which is
consistent with the Kornai and Blanchard views of the necessary early decline in
the old sectors. But the common view that the early pain is quickly rewarded with
substantial gain is also confirmed, the coefficient being clearly positive for the
second period.
The “no pain, no gain” view finds strong support in many studies, in partic-
ular, Åslund, Boone, and Johnson (1996); Wolf (1997); Hernández-Catá (1997);
and Heybey and Murrell (1999). In contrast, Berg and others (1999) make an
important contribution on this issue by using more sophisticated lag structures and
separating out public and private sector. They conclude that “effects of structural
reforms are mostly positive from the beginning.” Their separation of public/private
may help clarify that, while the larger old sector continues to decline in response
to reforms, this decline is not large and in some cases is ambiguous. For example,
components of reform such as external liberalization may have an immediate posi-
tive impact on state sector growth. On the other hand, the smaller new sector reacts
to hard-budget signals of reform immediately and unambiguously. Thus, in early
years, there may be negative growth, but Berg and others interpret this not as the
“pain of reforms,” but as costs of incomplete reforms. This is a useful refinement,
which is not fundamentally at odds with the rest of the literature. Finally, on the
separate effects of components, it is notable in Havrylyshyn, Izvorski, and van
Rooden (1998) that for the second, or recovery period, every one of four elements
is separately significant, but when the aggregate index plus one of the elements is
included serially to test for the possibility of combined effects, only internal liber-
alization remains significant—both in the decline period when it is negative and in
the recovery period when it is positive. For all these separate elements, the coeffi-
cient is larger in the recovery period, suggesting the cumulating payoffs to growth
over time. This may help explain the strong CIS recoveries of 1999–2001 despite
the plateauing of reform efforts there since 1997.
Consider next privatization, which of course has been very controversial in
itself, and highly criticized by many, perhaps most vocally in Stiglitz (1999). The
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13Havrylyshyn and van Rooden (1998) update data to 1998 and confirm the Havrylyshyn, Izvorski,
and van Rooden (1998) results for the recovery period.vast empirical literature on effects of privatization in transition has been recently
reviewed in Havrylyshyn and McGettigan (2000), as well as Djankov and Murrell
(2000). While, not surprisingly, there remain substantial arguments about whether
privatization could have been done better, avoiding the worst of insider-
privatization inequity and subsequent stagnation, the evidence of these two
surveys suggests that in many—if not all—cases, improved performance and
increased efficiency ensued. The effect was stronger when outside control could
be more effective, as with foreign investors, or in de novo enterprises whose
resources frequently came from idle capital and labor of old enterprises. This
suggests privatization has indeed led to reallocation and X-efficiency gains. But
the evidence is far from overwhelming and leaves plenty of room for the view that
all is not well with privatization.14 In particular, the evidence is limited on two
important dimensions: Havrylyshyn and McGettigan (2000) conclude in their
survey that research has paid too much attention to the method of privatization and
not enough to the “institutions of an appropriate enabling market environment,”
and has also largely ignored the contribution of de novo enterprises. 
A glance at the third column in Table 2 (Liberalization or Reform) does indeed
show that use of privatization as an explanatory variable in growth does not gener-
ally consider the market environment, or method, or de novo enterprises. True, one
of the reform indices used by several studies covers broadly the element “private
sector environment,” but it is a general category in the EBRD indices comprising
several subcomponents including progress in restructuring of state firms. For what
it is worth, the results are usually statistically significant. The separation of
public/private may have clarified that, while the larger old sector continues to
decline, the smaller new sector reacts to hard budget signals of reform immedi-
ately. Thus, in early years, there may be negative growth in total but, as noted,
Berg and others interpret this not as pain of reforms, but as costs of incomplete
reforms. By separating public and private sector, they show reforms have some
initial negative effect on public sector, but are immediately offset by gains in
private sector. Thus, the bigger the private sector share, the larger the positive
impact on growth.
One of the most recent studies on privatization (Zinnes, Eilat, and Sachs,
2001, in this Special Issue of IMF Staff Papers) goes much farther in trying to
disentangle the effects of formal change of ownership and the market environment
facing firms. The market environment is measured by a composite (and subjective)
index reflecting a true change of the firms’objective function to profit maximiza-
tion, a true hard budget constraint, and an effective agency climate. The results in
panel regressions for output levels (instead of growth rates) are compelling.
Change of ownership alone has virtually no effect; combined with a strong envi-
ronment index (a multiplicative variable), the effect is positive and highly signifi-
cant, but there is a minimum threshold for the market environment index before
one sees a positive impact of the change of ownership. Zinnes, Eilat, and Sachs
may be overly rhetorical in claiming that the insignificance of change of owner-
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14Nellis (2001) considers all these factors and the evidence, and presents some counterarguments to
the revisionist critics like Stiglitz.ship variable implies a “failing grade” for the Washington Consensus. First, the
Washington Consensus clearly talks of the role of the state in providing legal,
market institutions, and property rights.15 Second, Zinnes, Eilat, and Sachs are not
able to show a strong negative effect of privatization in a poor market environ-
ment. Their study is, nevertheless, a powerful statement about the crucial impor-
tance of the institutional changes needed to achieve a competitive hard-budget
environment and good corporate governance. This jargon boils down to saying,
you need good institutions to ensure that the new Kornai market incentives truly
lead to the Blanchard optimal reallocation of resources.
While it is often stated that new enterprise formation is critical, perhaps
because of data difficulties only one substantial econometric study relating growth
and new enterprise formation has been done. Berkowitz and De Jong (2000), using
data from 47 regions of Russia, obtain results strongly supportive of the conven-
tional view and affirm the more qualitative assessment of Åslund, Boone, and
Johnson (1996) of the early growth surge in Poland.
Initial Conditions
A third set of conclusions relates to initial conditions (e.g., overindustrializa-
tion and price distortions in Soviet period) and other factors specific to countries
such as wars; it is generally agreed these do have a country-specific effect, though
different studies attribute a different magnitude of importance. De Melo, Denizer,
and Gelb (1997) group many different initial conditions into two clusters with
principal components analysis and find a substantial impact; while Åslund, Boone,
and Johnson (1996) argue that the more inward-looking and generally overindus-
trialized economies in the former Soviet Union faced a bigger hurdle than did
Central Europe. Fischer and Sahay (2000) conclude that the length of communism
and distance from Western Europe plus other initial conditions “go far in
accounting for performance.” But other studies suggest that the effect declines
over time, and with refinement of variable measurement. Berg and others (1999),
applying lags and exclusion tests, conclude that achievement of stabilization and
progress in structural reforms (i.e., policies) explain most of the differences
between the better growth performance of Central and Eastern Europe and the
poorer performance of the CIS countries. Initial conditions do have a limited
impact, but this is strongly adverse only in early years, diminishing quickly over
time (with a half-life of five years). Havrylyshyn, Izvorski, and van Rooden (1998)
also find that initial condition variables are significant—even when crudely
measured by share of industry—but they go on to show that these effects not only
decline over time, but they also are not immutable effects and could have been
offset with a greater effort at reforms. Thus, for example, in Ukraine, the higher
industry share compared to the CIS average did contribute to a lower growth rate,
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15It often takes fresh blood and someone uninvolved in heated academic debates to cut to the heart of
the matter; Moers (1999), in a preliminary Ph.D. paper, concludes: “Thus it seems not so much the case
that policies of the “Washington Consensus” are wrong, but rather they are incomplete, or at least not
balanced enough” (p. 37).but that difference in growth could have been made up by achieving a level of the
reform index only slightly higher (on a scale of 0–1.0, a rise from 0.57 to 0.65)—
about equal to Kazakhstan’s. This result is disputable, of course, being based on a
linear impact of reforms; if there are positive nonlinear effects, or threshold levels,
it would mean that a larger leap forward on reforms may be required to offset
initial conditions, but, at the same time, the eventual impact on growth would then
be greater.
Rather than estimate the impact of initial conditions on growth, another way
of looking at this issue is to hypothesize that initial conditions play an indirect role
through the politics of determining how committed a government is to stabilize
and undertake structural reform. Fischer and Sahay (2000) recognize this but do
not model it explicitly. Wolf (1997) takes this approach in a clear, simultaneous
two-equation model, and de Melo and others (1997) also address this, with a sepa-
rate regression explaining the degree of liberalization achieved. Both studies
conclude that reforms are affected by initial conditions, but more analysis needs to
be done to determine if any additional separate effect on growth exists.
Institutions
The fourth set of conclusions concerns institutions: put simply, they matter too
and increasingly so over time. Despite the fact that both proponents of the
Washington Consensus and of the institutionalist school discussed the need for
institutional development in the early 1990s (Fischer and Gelb, 1991; Murrell,
1992), the first group of growth studies did not attempt to include institutional
variables—perhaps because of the lack of data. Since 1997, the reverse has been
true, with most studies incorporating some such measure, usually based on
surveys of policy environment (Freedom House, Heritage Foundation,
Transparency International, Wall Street Journal, World Bank), and most finding
strong evidence that these variables are significant and generally of the expected
sign. One interesting peculiarity is that some studies that purport to “correct” the
omission of institutions in studies explaining growth either omit the other explana-
tory factors altogether (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton, 1999; Campos,
2000), or find poor results for the other policy variables (Brunetti, Kisunko, and
Weder, 1997; Moers, 1999). Moers clearly admits this is odd and explains that it
is attributable to an econometric problem, given the small cross-country samples
and high correlation of liberalization indices and institutional development.
Despite this, he still concludes that macroeconomic stabilization is important. But
Havrylyshyn and van Rooden (2000) using time series for institutional variables,
undertake panel regressions for much larger observations sets and, with a principal
components analysis, form three clusters of institutions: legal, political, and
overall. They are able to obtain regression results that retain the significance of
stabilization, liberalization, and initial conditions variables, and in addition show
that institutional variables are also separately significant. Using a time multiplica-
tive transformation, they further demonstrate that, while initial conditions become
less important over time, institutions become increasingly important. That is, early
growth can be stimulated by stabilization and liberalization even if institutional
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institutional improvement; this is consistent with the result on privatization of
Zinnes, Eilat, and Sachs (2001).
Factor Inputs
The fifth and final set of conclusions demonstrates the unimportance of tradi-
tional factor input explanations for growth, differentiating transition economies
from others covered in the large recent literature on growth (a good overview is in
Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995). Wolf (1997); Havrylyshyn, Izvorski, and van
Rooden (l998); Campos (2000); and De Broeck and Koen (2000a) all conclude that
investment has not been a significant determinant of growth—the last study being
based on factor decomposition and total factor productivity calculations. This
should not be so surprising given the short period of time since recovery began in
transition countries and, as Havrylyshyn and others (1999) note; “for over-industri-
alized, distorted, and inefficient transition economies, recovery only comes after
some elimination of the wasteful old production . . . and usually cannot be based on
a large investment effort to build the new before the proper incentives for efficient
resource use are in place” (p. 17). The conceptual framework noted in Section I and
in Figure A1 in the Appendix strongly suggests a sequence of various efficiency
improvements, with traditional factor input expansion coming only later. Indeed,
the best guess one can make about why most of the studies did not even include
variables representing factor inputs (and guess one must, as none explain this) is
that they considered—quite sensibly it turns out—that these were not important
explanatory variables. The bottom line here is that growth in transition—in a so far
rather short period of less than a decade—is more a special short-run phenomenon
than the conventional long run considered in the general literature. Thus, it is not
surprising that expansion of factor inputs have not yet been important.
Further suggestive evidence comes from trends in the investment to GDP ratio
discussed in Havrylyshyn and others (1999). Of the 17 countries with sustained
growth to date and adequate data on investment, the most common pattern for the
investment of GDP ratio is a decline from the central plan period levels of 30
percent and more to near 20 percent or even lower. Further, for the 17 countries,
an upturn in the ratio of investment to output preceded the recovery in only 3
cases, while it coincided with the beginning of recovery in 5 countries and actu-
ally lagged the upturn in output in 9. It is therefore not surprising that the econo-
metric specification of recent empirical studies on growth during transition, while
broadly analogous to those of the new growth theory, ignores the long-term factors
such as investment, and focuses on efficiency-improving factors such as macro
policies, structural reforms, and property rights climate.
Some Common Methodological Difficulties
As the studies listed in Table 2 address a common question (what explains
growth in transition countries), it is not surprising that they have to contend with
common analytical difficulties concerning measurement and choice of modeling
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differences and how these may affect some of the results described above.
The first measurement problem concerns valuation of output. With the excep-
tion of Loungani and Sheets (1997), all the studies content themselves with offi-
cial GDP values, notwithstanding the consensus view that unofficial activity may
account for as much as 40–45 percent of total output in some countries. The
reasons given include, in particular, the unavailability of consistent estimates of
unofficial economy for the full sample of countries over an extended period. While
this is understandable, it may still be troublesome if there is reason to believe that
growth in the official sector differs substantially from growth of the unofficial
sector. Loungani and Sheets do a great service on this score by demonstrating for
a smaller sample of countries that using an index of electricity output (perhaps the
most common estimator of total output) does not change the results of growth
equations. Hernández-Catá (1997) includes a correction variable (ratio of
measured output to power consumption); the results on the major policy variables
are not materially affected, but the variable is significant and replaces the role of
the FSU and war dummies—suggesting that the biggest underreporting is in those
cases. Key writings on the unofficial economy (Johnson, Kaufmann, and Shleifer,
1997) fully confirm the latter point and emphasize that strong sustainable growth
only comes in a policy environment that induces shadow activities to become open
and official. At a minimum, this implies that in the recovery and positive GDP
growth period, shadow activities become relatively less important. It does also
imply, however, that in the decline period official output falls more rapidly than
total output, which further implies that estimated coefficients of explanatory vari-
ables such as initial conditions or liberalizing reforms overstate the negative
impact on output in the early period. As already noted, Åslund (2001) makes some
very rough corrections for this as well as several Soviet-accounting problems, and
claims that the correction strengthens the positive effect of reforms. This issue
deserves more analysis.
Looking more closely at unfavorable initial conditions that are found to have
a negative effect and to decline over time, correction of the unofficial GDP bias is
unlikely to do more than imply an earlier fading away of these negative effects. A
more important modification of conclusions could come about on the hypothesis
of “no pain, no gain”—that is, reforms inevitably cause early pain. Most studies,
with the exception of Berg and others (1999), conclude that, while reforms have
unquestionably a positive influence on growth in the long run, the short-run effect
is negative, as closures or cutbacks by inefficient producers are faster than expan-
sion of new efficient production is elsewhere. It is possible that correcting official
GDP data gives a lower output fall and/or higher positive growth; thus the nega-
tive effects may be less strong and a ceteris paribus estimate of the reforms coef-
ficient would yield a positive value. The puzzle remains, since GDP correction has
not been done for a systematic large sample to allow its use in growth empirics.
Berg and others came to their “no pain at all” conclusion despite the fact that they
use official GDP data. In the end, however, all analysts agree that reforms are good
for growth, whether or not they cause some pain early on, so the logical puzzle
may have limited impact on policy implications.
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this may be part of the reason why the literature cannot give clean results on how
state-sector finances, broadly defined, affect growth. But the conclusion about
inflation control is universal and one could not ask for stronger empirical support
on the crucial role of stabilization. Indeed, it may not be necessary to have solid
econometric estimates of how financial imprudence by governments—be it budget
deficits, off-budget operations, tax relief, or soft credits—contributes to inflation.
Once it is accepted that inflation harms growth, the policy argument for fiscal
prudence, transparency, and credit tightness is sufficiently well grounded.
Perhaps the measurement difficulty that leads to the most serious problem for
policy conclusions is that relating to institutions. Not only the transition literature,
but also the general literature on institutions, has great difficulty coming to grips
with what exactly it is one means by institutions, and how they can be objectively
measured.16 Studies that do consider institutions are broadly in consensus that the
ex post measurement problem is not overwhelming, and the subjective indices are
sensible. But if institutions are but a state of being (subjectively) measurable by
surveys, it is difficult to be as concrete in policy recommendations as with mone-
tary and fiscal measures. This serious policy dilemma is beyond the scope of this
paper.
The modeling difficulties for transition countries are in principle substantial,
but in practice may not comprise a serious impediment to drawing valid and useful
conclusions. The general literature on growth itself includes ongoing debates
about the right structural form to capture the spirit of the new endogenous growth
theory (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995) or the right methodology (cross-country,
time-series, panel—see, for example, Quah, 1999). When one turns to transition
economies and their recovery in the short run, as opposed to the medium- and
long-term equilibrium path, the difficulties mount. Consider Figure A1; the point
CPI represents the starting point before transition begins with Soviet level ineffi-
ciency in the allocation between goods and factors, plus X-inefficiencies for pure
wastage.
Any reasonable reading of what has to happen—and in retrospect generally
did happen—suggests several events of output decline or expansion occur before
a new market-determined equilibrium is approached and before an equilibrium
path of growth (arrow 5 in Figure A1) is embarked upon. First, output will fall to
a lower level of capacity (CPU) compared to CPI; then it could of course rebound
toward CPI (arrow 1). The important gains of Russia and Ukraine in import substi-
tution since their August 1998 devaluation are of this kind, though clearly
preceded by some minor restructuring. But any such rebound is probably hidden
in a simultaneous move involving the many resource shifts that Blanchard (1997)
theorizes about and which a vast literature on restructuring (reviewed in Djankov
and Murrell, 2000) describes. These resource shifts include technical efficiency
gains, or moves toward the efficiency frontier (arrow 2); perhaps illustrated by
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16See Fukuyama (2000) for a general view of the institutional measurement problem. Kaufmann,
Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton (1999) is a good comprehensive source for the myriad efforts to use survey
data that measure institutional development.improvements in efficiency of Polish state enterprises as documented by Belka
and others (1995); gains from achieving efficient factor proportions (arrow 3)—
the labor-shedding and resultant increases in labor productivity as shown in De
Broeck and Koen (2000a and 2000b); and finally the gains from less production
of unwanted goods and the shift of resources to production of other goods (arrow
4)—the sectoral shifts noted in Berkowitz and De Jong (2000) and the product-line
shifts as described in EBRD (1997). All of this adds up to a complex, but eventu-
ally clear, picture reminiscent of Harberger’s (1998) vision of the growth process,
as a “thousand and one little changes” at the firm level that happen daily and add
up to measured growth in GDP.
Modeling this for econometric analysis seems a daunting task and it is there-
fore no surprise that virtually all the growth regressions reviewed here take an ad
hoc (but we would say sensible) approach to specification, with only limited
efforts to derive a structural form from first principles. There are two exceptions.
Hernández-Catá (1997) starts with a standard production function with a state and
private sector, the latter with higher productivity. Liberalization increases share of
the private sector, but time lags in resource allocation result in underutilization of
capacity. As inflation and certain state variables (initial conditions) can affect both
the liberalization and the pick-up of capacity, the model is readily modified to a
form identical to other studies with no factor inputs, but instead policy variables
like reforms, inflation/stabilization, exchange regime, and initial conditions vari-
ables or dummies. Berg and others (1999) begin with a three-equation model in
which the growth equation already omits factor inputs on the right-hand side while
the two other equations reflect policy determination and structural changes since
transition, to capture the possible changes in impact of policies or initial condi-
tions on growth as transition progresses. In the econometrics—which is unques-
tionably the most detailed of all the studies—only the first equation is estimated,
the other two providing a rationale for using certain instrumental variables and for
a methodology of “general to specific” estimation, which allows the large panel
data set to choose the proper specification. Table 2 includes a summary of what
variables they use in the end to derive conclusions.
All other studies, if less formal, tend to specify quite similar regression equa-
tions, and have more or fewer variables depending on whether they are strict cross-
sections or panels. As Table 2 and the preceding discussion conclude, these
different studies reach more or less similar broad conclusions on the importance
of various factors and how the effects of initial conditions fade over time.
However, more complex questions—such as the importance and timing of partic-
ular elements of reform, ideal policy combinations, and differential impacts of
structural reforms and stabilization over time (the “no pain, no gain” debate)—are
only addressed by studies with panel data, which have more possibility for econo-
metric fine-tuning. But the greater methodological sophistication does not resolve
all debates. For example, consider the two studies that are based on more formal
derivation from structural equations. Hernández-Catá strongly concludes that
reforms initially have a negative effect on output as state sector losses are not
immediately offset by private sector expansion. Berg and others find evidence of
a negative effect on the state sector, but the associated losses are more than offset
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only weak support for fixed exchange rates, while Berg and others show strong
evidence that fixed exchange rates are important. It is not the intent here to resolve
these differences one way or another; since the results use different models,
periods, and econometric techniques, comparing them is difficult. The use of a
more formally derived model and more thorough econometric analysis helps illus-
trate subtler points, but does not change the broad conclusions of what matters for
growth, and resolves some but not all the debated issues.
IV. Conclusions: Considerable Consensus, Some Debates, and
Some Puzzles
What is most striking about this survey of empirical studies analyzing deter-
minants of growth in transition is the wide scope of consensus compared with the
limited range of continued debate or puzzles. It is agreed that no royal road to
growth exists but that a wide range of good policies is needed, including financial
stabilization, market liberalization, and market-friendly government rules and
institutions. One should not misunderstand this, however, since the wide agree-
ment on what policies are needed to achieve strong sustainable growth still leaves
large differences in views on how to implement these policies, what sequence to
follow, and what relative importance to give to each. Many of these large differ-
ences are explored elsewhere in this Special Issue of IMF Staff Papers. Here, the
emphasis remains on the determinants, and this section summarizes the key points
of consensus, some of the outstanding debates, and a handful of interesting
puzzles.
Five Points of Consensus
The overwhelming area of consensus is that traditional factor inputs have no
role in explaining growth over time and across countries. The empirical evidence
confirms the short-run nature of both the decline and the recovery, as well as the
clear perception that Soviet-type economies were well inside their production
frontiers and off their comparative advantage equilibrium. Investment ratios have
no explanatory power or significance to speak of; their trend over time suggests
almost a reverse causation—that is, they begin to rise only after growth has begun
to recover. Efficiency gains appear to be the main, if not sole, source of growth. It
is, of course, implausible that efficiency improvements come without new invest-
ment, but this paradox is easily resolved. The econometric analysis finds no signif-
icance of aggregate investment in the output recovery, which in no way denies the
contribution of individual investment projects in spurring growth in sectors and
firms. Nor does the result deny that aggregate investment will become increasingly
critical in sustaining growth as the recovery proceeds and the new equilibrium
growth path of a market economy is reached.
There is little or no argument that a decline in output was inevitable, and that
it had to be about as large as the 20–25 percent fall seen in most of Central Europe;
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mitigated by better policy is discussed below under “Debates.”
There is equally strong consensus that financial stabilization, in particular
inflation control, is a necessary first step before sustainable growth can occur. But
it is also agreed that stabilization is not sufficient, and thus market liberalization
or structural reform (correction of various price and qualitative distortions of
central planning) are identified in many econometric studies as the most important
factor—though the statistical measure of “relative importance” varies. It is diffi-
cult to conceptualize the precise meaning of attributing “most” importance to one
determinant, given the solid evidence that other factors—like initial conditions,
stabilization, and some minimum of institutions—are also necessary. A fair state-
ment might be that, given some minimum of these other factors, the differences in
growth performance are attributable in particular to differences in the progress on
market reforms. Related to this is the conclusion on the role of privatization and
expansion of the private sector. Empirical evidence suggests it was on balance
beneficial to growth, though some debate continues as noted below.
There is slightly less consensus on initial conditions, though no one disagrees
that they have some, at least initial, at least minor impact. The evidence is clear
that the negative burden of Soviet inheritance (excess industrialization,17 energy
inefficiency, inertia of price distortions, geographical and historical distance from
the market, civil wars) does have a hindering effect on growth, albeit not clearly
separate from its indirect effect as a brake on speedy reform implementation. The
econometrics also reveals that this effect is less important than stabilization and
structural reform, declines over time, and can be offset by stronger progress in
transition.
On institutional development, there is a somewhat surreal consensus, with all
agreeing that good institutions are one of the necessary components in the recipe.
For what it is worth, studies by proponents of the Washington Consensus and its
critics all obtain the same strong, econometric results ex post: institutional indices
have significant and positive coefficients. But the debate is not on whether insti-
tutional development–like patriotism is a good thing, but on what it comprises and
whether it should be added to the transformation recipe before, during, or after the
stabilization and liberalization.
Five Continuing Debates
The least well resolved—and arguably most important—continuing debate
concerns the timing and sequencing of institutional reforms. From a historical
perspective, it is difficult to assess empirically a relevant counterfactual: had there
been greater and/or earlier efforts on developing effective judicial, rule-of-law,
conditions, easier entry, stronger exit rules, and competition, would there have
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17It is fair to ask why the very high human capital of the military-industrial complex should not have
been a favorable initial condition. One interpretation would be that it was, but poor policy implementa-
tion precluded quick and effective utilization of this comparative advantage endowment. We are not aware
of any study that looks at this.been even better performance? The only, very weak, suggestive econometric
evidence is the result in Havrylyshyn and van Rooden (2000) that the impact of
institutions increases over time. In other words, good economic policies (macro
and micro) may be enough to get growth started even with poor institutions, but as
time goes on, institutional development must proceed apace or growth will falter.
This is, however, only suggestive evidence, and much more empirical analysis
would be needed to move to consensus even on the history. For a future policy
perspective, the lesson that more weight should be given to institutions is clear, but
two dilemmas remain. First, what exactly is to be done by policymakers and
particularly by outside parties such as the IMF and the World Bank? Second, there
is insufficient hard empirical evidence to refute the alternative view that institu-
tions must come first and only then should liberalization and privatization
proceed.
An equally difficult debate continues on the speed of reforms, or gradualism
vs. Big Bang—and it is reflected in this Special Issue of IMF Staff Papers. Little
explicit analysis has been done, with the exception of Heybey and Murrell (1999)
on the one hand arguing speed does not help, and Berg and others (1999), on the
other hand showing it does. A large part of the problem is defining speed—and the
two studies do it slightly differently. Another difficulty is whether an earlier start
or faster speed is more important. Given the wide consensus that antireform vested
interests (the most important being new capitalist rent-seekers) have captured the
process in many countries, it is hard to deny a hypothesis that, say, Ukraine and
Russia, might have needed an even bigger Big Bang in the mid-1990s to get same
effect as Poland did in 1989–90. In support of those who say speed is less impor-
tant than the accumulated, absolute level of reforms reached, there is suggestive
evidence from the high rates of growth finally achieved in CIS countries in
1999–2000—and apparently continuing. It will be useful in a few years to ask how
much this is attributable to cumulative benefits of reforms, exogenous effect of
energy prices, a sharp rebound from the very low levels reached (recall Armenian
and Georgian growth in the mid-1990s), or finally the long-term convergence
effects described in the general growth literature.
Does “distance from the market” matter or, more usefully, how does it matter?
The empirical evidence on such initial conditions as years under communism and
geographical distance from Western Europe is strong, and seems to say Poland or
the Czech Republic were inevitably better placed to perform better than Ukraine
or the Kyrgyz Republic. The fact that these immutable conditions—or “hard
conditions” as Zinnes, Eilat, and Sachs (2001) usefully categorize them—makes
the issue all the more important. But such a view is troubling in several respects.
First, it is not yet clear from the literature whether these conditions affect growth
performance directly, or only indirectly through the political economy effect of
slower if not actually frozen reforms. Second, even on the latter interpretation,
there are many other considerations of perhaps greater importance, such as the
anchor effect of EU accession prospects. Finally, there is a potentially malevolent
misinterpretation of this distance hypothesis. In many of the slower reformers, the
old and new interests that oppose reforms often find it very convenient to use such
an argument to delay reforms. Observers of transition should be very cautious of
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market”; often these statements reveal that the speaker is not ready for a real,
competitive market economy in which capitalism is an opportunity for all the
people and not just a few.
While, so far, privatization has been found to be generally beneficial, and it
seems at least no worse than continued public ownership, there remains both a
strong perception and some empirical evidence that “badly done” privatization
can actually be harmful. The perception is particularly strong in many of the CIS
countries, where the inequity of privatization favoring a privileged few—a percep-
tion with considerable truth—may lead to even more damaging indirect effects as
the populace opposes further market reforms. The empirical evidence of actually
negative effects is limited—as in the Zinnes, Eilat, and Sachs article—but too
compelling to ignore altogether.
Finally, let me turn to the debate on how much pain may be caused in the early
part of the transition. As discussed earlier, most analysts are of the view that some
early pain is inevitable, as stabilization and reform starts, but that the eventual
benefits compensate for this and vindicate the aphorism of “no pain, no gain.” The
analysis by Berg and others, by separating public and private sector, contradicts the
general views as it finds the benefits of reform are seen immediately in the private
sector and, of course, the aggregate value of these benefits increase equally as the
share of the private sector grows. The contradiction may be more semantic than
substantive. Transition is not instantaneous; hence the good policies themselves
and subsequent results take some time. In the meantime, the old (i.e., public) sector
undergoes the pain of closure and cutbacks of employment probably faster than
new expansion occurs in private. Thus, transition is inevitably painful. But it,
nevertheless, remains the case, as Berg and others argue, that it is not reforms that
give the negatives (the pain), but the lack or slowness of reforms. As soon as
reforms (including privatization) are made, their positive impact is immediate.
A Handful of Puzzles
Perhaps the first puzzle that future analysis might eventually answer is why the
transformational recession was quite as deep as it was, even in Central Europe.
As noted, there may still be a debate about why it was greater in the CIS and Baltic
countries, but a lot of insight has been gained on this relative performance; the
puzzle is about the absolute decline; was the 20 percent or so seen minimally in
the Czech Republic, about what one should have expected in the Kornai transfor-
mational recession, about equal to the amount of “useless” or negative value-
added Soviet production? In a sense, Berg and others (1999) do propose an
answer, saying initial conditions explain not only the variation across the group,
but the actual decline as well, and that policy reforms do not have any further
negative impact on output levels. Åslund (2001) also addresses this, and is
strongly skeptical that the decline was anything like official GDP shows. But the
vast majority of analyses concur the decline was large and often say or imply it
has been surprisingly large. This may not ever be adequately answered as it is
difficult to envision the correct counter factual, never mind measure it.
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econometric significance: exports and foreign direct investment.18 Qualitative
assessments of the more successful performers in Central Europe and the Baltic
countries, in contrast, attribute a considerable role to both these variables. Foreign
investments have been substantial, especially in the more advanced transition
economies, as the article by Garibaldi, Mora, Sahay, and Zettelmeyer (2001) in
this Special Issue of IMF Staff Papers shows. Perhaps the problem is an econo-
metric one, as these two variables may be strongly correlated to each other and to
the “good policy” variables, thus hindering efficient estimation.
A continuing puzzle remains on the low decline and high growth of Belarus
and Uzbekistan. Certainly, the authorities of these countries and many critics of
the standard reform school continue to point to these cases as successful gradual
reforms. But even official figures show that growth there has slowed a lot, while
the rest of the CIS show an accelerating trend. To resolve this issue, it will require
either a clear reversal as was seen earlier in Bulgaria and Romania, which also had
positive growth with limited reforms, or much more compelling explanation by
one school of thought or the other. One quite unexplored hypothesis is that
stronger central discipline has permitted a recouping of some of the loss from the
1960s Soviet-level efficiency that occurred in the Brezhnev and subsequent
periods. But even if a convincing case is eventually made that retention of central
plan discipline mitigates any negative effect, these two countries are likely to
remain, in practice, the exception rather than the rule.
APPENDIX
Efficiency Improvements, Reallocation,
and Investment as Proximate Sources of Growth in the Transition: 
A Conceptual Framework
The mechanism or proximate sources of growth in the recovery phase of tran-
sition is illustrated in Figure A1.
• CP* represents the point of potential production on the production possibil-
ities functions (PPF) under central planning if full capacity is utilized,
factors are not wasted (as at XI1, at which more K and L are being used
to produce 1 unit of good B than at the efficiency frontier), and shadow
prices of K and L are reflected in the central plan’s factor allocation. In
this case, the only error under CP* is to ignore world prices.
• CPI is the point where factor and technical inefficiency of central planning
also exist, but capacity is fully utilized; historically this is roughly
equivalent to pre-1990 production.
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18Cotarelli and Doyle (1999) do show significant and positive coefficients for an export proxy, growth
of the markets for a given country’s exports, but this is a rather indirect and, hence, insufficiently,
compelling result. A few other studies that did include export growth found no significance.• CPU reflects a decline in production levels (as in post-1990), and lower
utilization of existing capacity.
• XI1 is inside the efficiency frontier of the unit isoquant for good B; K and L
are used wastefully relative to the theoretical best practice point for
central planning, XI1*.
• M1 is a point on the PPF “inherited” from resource accumulation during the
period of central planning. No aggregate net investment is necessary in
moving to M1, but there could be gross new investment in the expanding
sector, so that allocation among goods can change, reflecting adjustment
of production (allocation) to world prices.
• M2 is an efficient goods allocation point with new net investment.
Using Figure A1, five types of changes (structural shifts) can be defined that
provide growth in the sense of more output for a given level of factor availability,
and more factor inputs.
1. Recovery from capacity underutilization (from CPU to CPI).
2. Technical efficiency or X-efficiency gains = movement to efficiency fron-
tier by eliminating wasteful usage of production factors (from CPI to CP*,
and from XI1 to XI1*).
3. Efficiency gains from achieving optimal factor proportions (from XI1* to
BCP*, and also from CPI to CP*).
4. Resource reallocation gains (from CP* to M1, that is, production of more
B and Less A, hence, also BCP* to BM1.
5. Net factor-expansion gains (from M1 to M2, and from BM1 to BM2, plus an
analogous shift to a higher level isoquant for good A).
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